The application was lodged on 2 May 2006. The applicant alleged that his right of access to a court had been violated as a result of the court’s refusal to accept his statement of claim.
The applicant is a police officer. In 2002 he divorced his wife and moved out from their apartment. On 18 June 2004 the applicant filed a claim for damages with the Wrocław Regional Court against the State Treasury – Wrocław Court of Appeal. At the same time he asked to be exempted from the court fees due in the proceedings. The Regional Court subsequently transferred the case to the Wrocław Krzyki District Court, which had in the meantime become competent to examine it.
The District Court ordered the applicant to indicate his place of residence. Nowinski informed the court that following his divorce he had had to move out from the apartment he had previously occupied at Gajowa Street in Wrocław. His name had been removed from the register of residents in 2002. Since then, he had been living with friends at different addresses. He gave a post-office box address for any correspondence and stressed that he could be reached every day at his work address, at the police station in Wrocław, Stare Miasto.
The District Court ordered that the statement of claim be returned to the applicant. The court held that the applicant had failed to indicate his place of residence. It noted that a post-office box or a work address could not be considered as a place of residence within the meaning of Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The applicant filed an interlocutory appeal against that decision. He argued that he did not have a permanent place of residence. He lived at different addresses, his last place of residence having been the apartment at Gajowa Street in Wrocław. He submitted that the refusal to admit his claim constituted a restriction on his right of access to a court.
The Wrocław Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision of 16 May 2005. The court held that the applicant had failed to indicate his place of residence. Since he had stayed at different addresses he should have indicated a place where he spent most of his time and where his daily activities were located.
Article 25 of the Civil Code provides: “The place of residence of a natural person shall be the town where that person stays with the intention of remaining permanently.” Article 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies what information should be contained in a pleading. Paragraph 2 provides in particular, that the first pleading submitted to a court should indicate the parties’ place of residence.
The applicant submitted that the limitations imposed on him had been disproportionate and did not correspond to the aim and function of the obligation contained in Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The applicant further noted that in legal theory “the place of residence” was a particular town and in the context of civil proceedings it meant an address of a party to the case with a view to ensuring proper communication between the court and that party. Having this in mind, he had indicated a post-office box as his address for correspondence. He had further given his work address – the police station in Wroclaw – as the place where he could be reached every day.
The applicant argued that the court’s decision not to treat the post‑office box and the work address as a place of residence within the meaning of Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure had resulted in a breach of his right of access to a court, preventing him from exercising his right to claim compensation for damage allegedly caused by public authorities.
He stressed that the decision imposed on him was a disproportionate sanction for allegedly failing to fulfil the formal requirements of civil procedure. The domestic authorities had not taken into account the fact that the means of communication he proposed was effective and guaranteed the proper conduct of proceedings in his case.
Lastly, the applicant stressed that his case was a dangerous example of a restrictive interpretation of procedural norms that could result in the legal and social exclusion of a population group comprising all those people who had no permanent place of residence. Although he himself was not homeless, but merely temporarily unable to indicate a permanent place of residence, he had been prevented from pursuing his claim before the courts.
The Court reiterated that the right of access to a court secured by Article 6 § 1 is not absolute but may be subject to limitations. In laying down such regulation, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, but the final decision as to observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court.
Limitations on the right to a court are compatible with Article 6 only if they do not restrict or reduce the access left to the litigant in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Moreover, such limitations will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if they do not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 1985).
The Court observed that the applicant attempted to institute civil proceedings for compensation and he provided the Regional Court with his work address and a post-office box address. However, the court considered that in spite of that information he had not indicated his “place of residence” within the meaning of Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the statement of claim was returned to him solely because he was unable to indicate a place of residence.
In Court’s opinion, a requirement to indicate a place of residence served a legitimate aim, namely the proper administration of justice. However, it considers that the strict application of that requirement in the applicant’s case constituted a disproportionate restriction on his right of access to court. The applicant at the time had no permanent place of residence, and for that reason was obliged to indicate stable addresses where he could be contacted.
The Court underlined that the applicant was in permanent contact with the domestic courts and it was in his best interest to ensure the proper course of the proceedings. The Government have not contended that the addresses provided by the applicant would not have sufficed to ensure proper service of court correspondence or would in any other way have disrupted the proper administration of justice. Furthermore, the Government failed to submit any arguments making it possible to assess the need for the limitations imposed on the applicant.
The Court found that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and awarded the applicant EUR 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.