-North Korea’s announcement that it possesses nuclear weapons is actually a sign of the regime’s internal weakness and Kim Jong Il’s need to maintain the military’s support in the face of eroding loyalty, says Young Howard, one of the human rights activists who attended the recent Seoul conference. -New information coming from inside North Korea shows how nuclear weapons may relate to the regime’s increasingly troublesome internal politics. (25-FEB-05)

This article is written by Young Howard, international coordinator for the human rights organisation North Korean Democracy Network, to appear in today’s edition of International Herald Tribune. Howard has also made his article available for publication at www.humanrightshouse.org, for which it has been slightly edited.

The iron curtain on North Korea has been lifted little by little in recent years by hundreds of thousands of refugees who have fled across the border to the People´s Republic of China. With their increasing use of Chinese cell phones, they are providing near-instantaneous news to the outside.

Bribing makes it possible to leave
Based on the accounts of these refugees and other defectors, significant changes in North Korea are visible that may weaken Kim’s horrific regime. Most important is the freer flow of people. Before the food shortages of the mid-1990s, people could not move from city to city without travel permits, which were issued only for events such as marriages or funerals. Now, due to the collapse of the food distribution system and rampant corruption, people can easily bribe police officers to procure travel permits. Last winter, $2 was enough for passage from one province to another, and $5 got you to Pyongyang and the Chinese border district. For $30, you could cross the Tumen and Yalu rivers into the People´s Republic of China, and for $70, you
could get an official passport.

Chinese consumer goods undermine China’s policy towards North Korea
These developments have created a new flow of information. According to defectors, people in North Korea now believe that in the People´s Republic of China even dogs eat better than they do. They also know that the Chinese can criticize the top leaders of their government, at least in private (the penalty for such dissent in North Korea is death). Of late, South Korean pop songs, soap operas and movies have become quite popular via Chinese cassette players and VCRs smuggled across the border.

The Kim cult is crumbling
This exposure has also led to the realization among North Koreans that the hardships of their life are not created by “imperialists” like the United States, but from within, by their own political leaders. Recently, some North Koreans have begun to openly criticize police officers for interfering in their economic activities. Among family and friends, people even criticize Kim Jong Il, something that was unimaginable just a few years ago. As a result, the personality cult surrounding Kim is being challenged.

Ironically, exaggerated market control only leads to black markets
The economic pillars propping up the regime have all but collapsed, defectors say. They say that insufficient food rations and salaries have forced citizens to fend for themselves. Before the shortages, the government controlled the economy through collectivized farms and state-owned factories. Now it has no alternative but to tacitly recognize black markets as the only lifeline for people. Though unauthorized, such markets began to spread across the country with amazing speed after the famine. Only in Pyongyang and some other militarily or industrially important regions does food continue to be distributed. Even there, controls have loosened up.

Ever fewer friends left
The haphazard economic reform since July 2002 has caused tremendous inflation – up to 1,000 percent in the price of rice. So the ability and willingness to engage in private business has become a major hedge against starvation. People now realize that Kim is neither their god nor their helper. Some feel he is an obstacle. Thirdly, the “Dear Leader’s” political support is deteriorating. Members of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party and state security officers have become more loyal to money than to Kim. Security officers offer films of the gulags for $10,000. Border guards reportedly seek people willing to pay to cross the rivers into the People´s Republic of China. According to high-ranking defectors, top-level officials have even launched a quiet campaign to save around $300,000 per family for use in the event of regime collapse. Consequently, Kim has fewer people he can trust. His brother-in-law, Jang Sung-taek, a long-time insider until last year, is known to have been recently purged.

Kim’s real dilemma: He can’t use his nuclear arms at home
From Kim’s perspective, this increasingly depressing reality underscores the need to maintain the military’s support. The centerpiece of his “military-first” policy is the nuclear weapons program. He is unlikely to bow to pressure from the international community to give it up, as this would deal a fatal blow to his power base. But nuclear weapons are not usable against those who may be the regime’s real enemies: ordinary people whose obedience and loyalty are disappearing. It may be only a matter of time before the army follows suit.