HRH has received indepth information on DR Congo and the continuing conflict which has now cost up to four million lives. Now that neighbouring Rwanda again threatens to invade DR Congo as part of its attempt to settle its own ethnic issues, there is every reason to try to understand a conflict that affects the region better. (09-DEC-04)
The information below was initially provided by the International Crisis Group (www.icg.org) and has been re-edited for re-publication here.
After the loss of some three million lives in Congo?s 1998-2002 war, most due to war-induced hunger and disease, only intense international pressure drove the belligerents to the negotiating table and into a peaceful transition. At the end of this month (July 2004), the world must decide to recommit itself to that peace process if Congo is to avoid a return to full-scale war.
The lingering tension and constant potential for violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo could hardly be more obvious after last month?s turmoil in and around Bukavu, the capital of the strategically sensitive South Kivu province that borders Rwanda. After clashing with transitional government troops, two renegade commanders captured Bukavu and held the town from 2 June to 9 June, leaving several hundred people dead and sending more than 30,000 Congolese fleeing into Burundi and Rwanda.
The fall of Bukavu to the renegades highlighted MONUC?s weaknesses and was a blow to the mission?s credibility. Its very ability to support the transition was thrown into doubt after it was unable to prevent the capture of the city by the mutineers and the subsequent violence. MONUC would appear to have been better advised to have taken the side of the loyalist troops from the beginning. Its mandate, after all, is to support the transition and, if necessary, the transitional government?s legitimate forces.
Instead, MONUC negotiated with the insurgents, who broke the deal and then proceeded to kill, rape, and loot without serious opposition.
The Bukavu war scare is a stark reminder that events in Congo could spiral into large-scale war again very quickly at nearly any time. The war that began in 1998 and cost the lives of at least 300,000 people as a direct result of fighting and violence and another 2.7 million through disease and starvation has never really ended. If the UN makes the right decision to re-enforce MONUC when its mandate is renewed by 1 October, then that end will be one step closer, and Congo?s peaceful transition will still have a chance.
What needs to be done
The Security Council should expand MONUC?s mandate and strengthen its capability to cope with future crisis situations such as Bukavu. To succeed, MONUC needs more troops, more capability, and more will to be able to act quickly and forcefully. The United Nations Security Council must endorse the Secretary General?s request for an additional 13,100 troops and key states must ensure that they are capable and well-equipped. Developed countries, in particular NATO and EU member states, but also other countries with this capacity, should provide a portion of the new troops and ensure that they are highly-trained and well-equipped. Such forces should include a rapid reaction force as well as a Special Forces battalion capable of, among other tasks, collection of information, provision of reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. Improving MONUC?s technical surveillance and intelligence capabilities is crucial, whether by providing contributions on the ground or making available the product of national assets.
The new force should include 100 NATO-trained staff officers to supervise the proposed creation of a Division Headquarters in eastern Congo. Strong, skilled leaders, and sound staff procedures are needed for a successful command and control reorganisation. MONUC would also greatly benefit from additional airborne transport assets.
Stronger mandate
Assuming that the additional capable troops are provided, MONUC?s mandate should be strengthened to eliminate current confusion and implement the Secretary General?s call ?to strengthen MONUC?s capacity to deter spoilers, particularly in key areas of potential volatility.? ICG urges the Council to explicitly authorise MONUC to ?respond robustly to any attack or threat of attack, including, if necessary, in a pre-emptive manner.? MONUC must take proactive action ? to the absolute maximum of its capacity ? to protect civilians and humanitarian workers under threat.
Secondly, the Security Council must reiterate its recognition that the Transitional Government is the sole legitimate governing authority in the Congo and urge MONUC to ?assist the efforts of the Government of National Unity and Transition to maintain or restore law and order and to stabilise the situation throughout the entire country.?
A key area of concern is the continued failure of the Congolese government to establish control over the country?s natural resources, which fuels breaches of the arms embargo and exacerbates the fragile security situation. MONUC should seize sites of known illegal exploitation, especially when it is evident that they constitute a financial lifeline for armed groups. While such a task is the responsibility of the national army, MONUC can perform this function in strategic areas, especially Ituri, until the government forces are capable of doing so.
Disarmament
One of the fundamental impediments to a successful transition in the Congo is the failure of the national army to establish control over the entire country and the continuing destabilising presence of armed groups, particularly of Rwandan Hutu rebels in eastern Congo, the Forces Dé¯cratiques de Lib鲡tion du Rwanda (FDLR).
Rwanda is legitimately concerned by the 8,000-12,000 FDLR combatants situated near its border, many of whom participated in the 1994 genocide. The international community must redouble its efforts to address the ongoing threat from the FDLR by applying pressure on the Transitional Government in Kinshasa to muster the political will and required resources to itself disarm foreign forces in eastern Congo, with active and robust assistance from a more proactive MONUC. A comprehensive solution also requires incentives for the FDLR to disarm and return to Rwanda, and Kigali must assist this process by re-engaging in political dialogue with its exiled opponents.
Other combatants and militias in eastern Congo also threaten to derail the Congolese peace process. Until such armed groups are disarmed and demobilised, Congo?s transition will be in danger. The government, assisted by MONUC, must seek their disarmament and demobilisation and undertake a more robust effort to dry up the sources of support of these groups.
Monitoring of arms
UNSC Resolution 1533 (2004) established a committee to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo imposed by UNSC Resolution 1493 (2003) and to make recommendations to strengthen its effectiveness. Following the 15 July 2004 report of the Group of Experts on the Congo, which concluded that Rwanda had supported, both directly and indirectly, the June attack on Bukavu, the Council should revisit the question of the arms embargo, note the conclusions of the Group of Experts, and express readiness to consider additional measures, such as revocation of visas and freezing of assets, if further violations of UNSCR 1493 and 1552 are committed.
Violations of the arms embargo unquestionably aggravate the conflict in Congo. The work of the Group of Experts, therefore, is of utmost importance. ICG appeals to the Council for an extension of its mandate until the end of the arms embargo on 31 July 2005. So long as the Council maintains the embargo, the Group of Experts should continue to report on its status. In addition MONUC should continue to support the Joint Verification Mechanisms between Congo and Rwanda and Congo and Uganda, ensuring that they begin functioning as soon as possible.
Political Process
The fundamental problem in the Congo, however, is the failure to implement the program of reform as agreed to in the December 2002 Pretoria Agreement. To date, the government of transition has not shown any will or capability to address the major political challenges, impeding the achievement of peace, stability and democracy in the country. ICG urges that the UN resume its partnership with South African leaders and bring together the key players to address the continuing political challenges, including the question of nationality, especially in eastern Congo, the creation of a national army, and the territorial unification of the country.
The International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) has not been active enough in representing its views and in providing a forum for cooperation by Kinshasa?s major international partners. CIAT should insist that the Transitional Government or individuals within it fulfil the commitments they have made. As always, all assistance and support must be contingent upon meeting reasonable standards of transparency and democratic accountability. A key objective of the international community must also be to support the independent institutions that will contribute to a sustainable democracy in the DRC, including those pursuing justice and reconciliation.
Regional Dynamics
What happens in the Congo is of direct concern to all its neighbours, particularly Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The Security Council should reiterate its demand that Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi abstain from belligerent involvement in the Congo. The Council should again condemn illegal exploitation of Congolese resources, encourage neighbouring states to exercise their influence in the Congo responsibly, and remind those states that a sustainable peace is the best way to protect their interests.
History of the conflict
The Congo?s most recent war originated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which over 500,000 minority Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus were slaughtered by an extremist Hutu government. Claiming that Hutu g鮯cidaires had taken refuge within eastern Congo, Rwanda and Uganda backed a May 1997 rebellion in Congo, removing Mobutu Sese Seko, the Congo?s leader since 1965, and replacing him with Laurent Kabila. However, when Kabila moved to purge Tutsis from his government, Rwanda intervened in the Congo for a second time, this time with the intention of removing Kabila. Rwandan troops backing Congolese Tutsi rebels invaded in August 1998, leading Kabila to seek assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Kabila managed to avoid the fate of his predecessor, Mobutu, but the Congo was launched into a conflict in which an estimated 3 million died, most of them from war-related disease and starvation. The countries involved, and later the non-governmental actors, signed up to a ceasefire at Lusaka, Zambia, in July 1999 and the UN Security Council sent a peacekeeping mission (MONUC) to the Congo in 2000.
The violence continued however, fuelled by mineral wealth in the east. Laurent Kabila himself was assassinated January 2001 and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. Peace negotiations went on through 2002, with Ugandan and Rwandan withdrawal to be met with the demobilisation and disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels in eastern Congo. By the end of 2002, Rwanda and Uganda claimed they had fully withdrawn from DRC, though their proxies remained.
A power-sharing unity government was set up under Joseph Kabila in July 2003 including four vice-presidents, three of them from former rebel groups. Meanwhile, a long-simmering conflict over land and mineral wealth in north-eastern Ituri region broke into widespread inter-ethnic violence and massacres 2002-2003. A nominally European but essentially French 3-month emergency mission was launched July 2003 and managed to contain a situation that UN troops had been unable to deal with. With the situation back under control, a more robust UN mission (MONUC II) deployed in the Congo.
The political transition has now stalled. The effort to establish a national army that can ensure stability in the country is faltering and various armed groups continue to threaten the stability of the country. The Congo?s neighbours continue to perceive the situation as a threat to their interests and have taken actions that further destabilise the fragile process of transition. The process of political transition is at risk of failure.
For more information on the background to the conflict in the Congo, see Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, Africa Report N?64, 13 June 2003. For a month by month account of the conflict since September 2003, see ICG?s CrisisWatch database.
Geographical information
DR Congo covers 2.3 million square kilometers and is the third largest country in Africa. It borders Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The population has been estimated at approximately 58.3 million. There are over 200 ethnic groups in DR Congo. The four largest groups — Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu) and the Mangbetu-Azande (Hamitic) — constitute nearly half of the population.
Important documents
3rd special report of the Secretary-General on the UN organization mission to DRC (August 2004)
Kinshasa agreement on Ituri pacification (May 2004)
Final report of panel of experts on illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth (October 2003)
Security Council resolution 1493 providing basis of MONUC mandate (July 2003)
Subsequent UN Security Council resolutions have modified or extended this resolution, though res. 1493 remains the essential text.
Transitional government constitution (2003)
Peace agreement between Rwanda and DRC (2002)
Original Security Council resolution (1291) authorising MONUC mission (February 2000)
Lusaka ceasefire agreement (1999)
Find out more about the conflict
Read ICG?s most recent briefing on the situation in Ituri:
Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem, Africa Report N?84, 26 August 2004.
Our other publications on Congo can be found here:
ICG Africa briefing, Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, 7 July 2004.
Media release and letter to UN Permanent Representatives and Belgian, French, South African, UK and U.S. foreign ministers, Prevent the Return to Full-scale War in the Congo, 24 Aug 2004
Op-Ed by ICG President Gareth Evans, UN peacekeeping: Congo on the brink of full-scale war, International Herald Tribune, 26 July 2004.
Gareth Evans? testimony to the U.S. House Subcommittee on Africa on “Supporting peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, 22 July 2004.
Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, Africa Report N?64, 13 June 2003
Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: a New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration, Africa Report N?63, 23 May 2003
The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict, Africa Report N?56, 24 January 2003
Storm Clouds Over Sun City: The Urgent Need To Recast The Congolese Peace Process, Africa Report N?44, 14 May 2002
For a month by month report on the conflict in the Congo since September 2003, check ICG?s CrisisWatch database.
What you can do
Inform yourself about the crisis.
Read ICG?s publications on DR Congo, details of which are set out above.
Tell a colleague – Email your friends and colleagues about the renewed conflict and threats to the humanitarian situation in DR Congo. Click here to go to our “tell a colleague” page. Insert a message, or copy our message at the top of this page and email it. The more people that are aware of deteriorating situation in the DR Congo, the better our ability to get the international community to respond.
Write to your newspaper – Write a letter to the editor of your national newspaper about the new dangers to the tentative peace in DR Congo. A selection of international newspapers is listed here, with email addresses to their letters pages.
Donate to organisations working in DR Congo – A selection of humanitarian organisations responding to the crisis in eastern DR Congo are listed here. The list is not exhaustive, and is not intended as an endorsement of any particular organisation. You are of course also very welcome to make a donation to our own International Crisis Group: we are an analysis and advocacy organization, rather than an aid-delivery one, but we depend very much on public support, as well as grants from governments and foundations, to carry on our work of conflict prevention and resolution.
What ICG does
ICG advocates policy solutions to the world?s leading policy makers on areas of actual or potention conflict across four continents.
Strong advocacy means disseminating the product as widely and effectively as possible, making sure that policy makers hear the message and then persuading them to take action. ICG distributes its reports:
? by direct mail of printed reports and papers to over 4,200 senior policy makers and those, in the media and elsewhere, who influence them;
? by email notification or attachment of reports and papers to 12,400 targeted “influentials”, and over another 13,500 recipients subscribing through the ICG website; and
? through our website, www.icg.org, which in 2003 received 1.2 million visits, and from which 1.3 million copies of ICG reports and briefing papers were downloaded during the course of the year.
Our major advocacy offices, in Brussels, Washington DC and New York, continue to ensure ICG has the access and influence at the highest levels of the U.S. and European governments, the UN, EU and NATO. Last year, a new liaison office was opened in Moscow to improve access to Russian decision makers; our London office was expanded to strengthen ICG?s profile and influence in the UK; and Brussels assumed responsibility for the other European “Permanent Five” member, France. All ICG offices, both advocacy and field, receive a regular flow of senior political and official visitors.
